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The Effect of Perception on Reactions to Reapportionment 
TRUMAN DA YID WOOD 1 
Mankato State College 
ABSTRACT-A port of the legislative reapportionment conflict in Minnesota was a product of dis-
torted perceptions by political actors such as the Minnesota Form Bureau . The Bureau's reaction 
to the Governor's Commission on Legislative Reapportionment was o result of the impact of the 
Bureau's ideology on its perception of the political system. The resultant failure of the Form Bu-
reau President to serve on the Governor's Commission denied that organization access to on im-
portant step in the decision-making process concerning legislative reapportionment . 
Political conflict is a result of perceived differences be-
tween and among political actors. The matter of percep-
tion is of distinct importance. The human being who ac-
cidentally ventures near a wasp's nest is perceived by the 
wasp as a threat to his security. The wasp attacks the 
human, even though the human had no real intention of 
bothering the wasp or his nest. So too, political contlict 
often arises or is intensified as a resu'1t of distorted per-
ceptions of the political behavior of others or of the po-
1,itical context. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political 
problem of legislative reapportionment and the conflicts 
arising therefrom in the state of Minnesota with particu-
lar reference to the effect of perception on the reactions 
of various political actors. The principal actors focused 
upon are (I) the Governor's Bipartisan Commission on 
Legislative Reapportionment and its Advisory Subcom-
mittee and (2) the Minnesota Farm Bureau . 
The Minnesota Farm Bureau's idea of a legislature 
was one composed of two houses, based on population, 
reflecting urban interests, and one based on area, refiect-
ing rural-agricultural interests. This idea was resound-
ingly rejected by Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren in 
Reynolds v. Sims: " Legislatures represent people , not 
trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters , not 
farms or cities or economic interests .... The fact that 
an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate rea-
son for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote . 
. .. We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the 
equal protection clause requires that the seats in both 
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned 
on a population basis.' ' 
Two events in the summer of 1964 brought the reap-
portionment conllict to the Minnesota scene. One was 
the suit brought in federal district court (Honsey v. 
Donovan) asking that the Minnesota legislative appor-
tionment law of 1959 be declared invalid on the grounds 
that it violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U.S . Constitution. The second 
was Governor Karl Rolvaag's appointment of the Gov-
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ernor's Bipartisan Commission on Legislative Reappor-
tionment. The Commission was to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor on legislative reapportionment 
that he , in turn could submit to the 1965 legislature. 
The Chairman of the Governor's Bipartisan Commis-
sion on Legislative Reapportionment ( GBCLR) was 
Franklin Rogers, editor of the Mankato Free Press. Mr. 
Rogers asked the author of thi s paper to form an Ad-
visory Subcommittee of political scientists and other in-
terested experts to perform the roles of ( I ) providing 
summarized background information in the form of 
study papers on subjects related to legislative reappor-
tionment, (2) providing staff assistance to the GBCLR, 
and ( 3 ) informing the public of the problem of reapor-
tionment. 
The Governor, in presenting his written mandate to 
the GBCLR, had indicated that its responsibility was to 
present proposals for legislative reapportionment within 
the confines of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by 
the U.S . Supreme Court and the Minnesota Constitution. 
In his oral mandate to the Commission , the Governor 
had presented numerous directly related topics that he 
perceived to be within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion. Ultimately , most of these topics were treated in 
study papers by members of the Advisory Subcommittee 
and submitted to the GBCLR and, finally , in the report 
to the Governor. 
The Governor had correctly perceived the direct re-
lation between many of the orally suggested topics and 
the central issue of reapportionment, but he had failed to 
recognize that a citizens' committee, such as the GBCLR, 
simply could not cope with the complexity of the issues, 
as outlined orally by the Governor, without govern-
mentally authorized fi scal resources. Having no such 
funds, the GBCLR was thus dependent upon the volun-
tary staff assistance of the Advisory Subcommittee . 
The GBCLR and the Advisory Subcommittee were 
perceived by the public as one single entity rather than 
as a citizens' committee served by a voluntary profes-
sional staff. The single entity was not perceived by aU 
actors in the political con!Jict in the same way. 
To the legislature, the GBCLR was perceived as an 
instrumentality of the Governor and legislative reappor-
tionment itself was perceived as a legislative matter ex-
clusively, and the Governor therefore, should have re-
frained from interfering in the area. The Governor was 
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unable to persuade any legislator to serve on the G BCLR 
although, ultimately, two ex-legislators, Peter Popovich 
and Chris Erickson, did serve on the Commission. 
To the Minnesota Farm Bureau, the GBCLR was not 
politically acceptable. Governor Rolvaag had originally 
appointed representatives from three major farm organ-
izations in Minnesota to the GBCLR: Clarence W. My-
ers, President of the Minnesota Farm Bureau; Archie 
Baumann, Secretary of the Minnesota Farmers Union; 
and William Pearson, Master of the Minnesota State 
Grange. No one was appointed to represent the National 
Farmers Organization, perhaps because the NFO was the 
first farm organization to clearly recognize the decline in 
the farmers' political power and to shift its major empha-
sis from political to economic pressure. The Minnesota 
Farm Bureau did not take the NFO's position nor did it 
choose to play a role in the GBCLR. 
On August 14, 1964, Minnesota F arm Bureau Presi-
dent Clarence W. Myers sent a letter of resignation to 
Governor Karl Rolvaag. Myers' resignation from the 
GBCLR was a decision fraught with conflict. Franklin 
Rogers, Chairman of the GBCLR, indicated that Myers 
had expressed a desire to resign on three previous occa-
sions, but each time Rogers had been able to convince 
Myers of the desirability of Myers' remaining on the 
Commission. Although it is difficult to specifically locate 
or trace the exact source of pressure, it seems apparent 
that there was within the Farm Bureau considerable 
pressure on Myers to maintain a solid front against the 
June 15, 1964 Supreme Court decision and any of its 
resultant political products. This pressure manifested it-
self in Myers' letter of resignation to the Governor which 
stated in part, "When I was contacted originally by your 
office to serve on this Special Commission on Reappor-
tionment , it was my opinion that this commission would 
give consideration to apportionment along the lines of 
our Farm Bureau policy, which calls for a state consti-
tutional amendment to provide for an area house as well 
as a population house in Minnesota. However, in read-
ing the charge to the commission, which directs it to 
draw up a proposal for reapportionment consistent with 
our current state constitution and the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, I find that I could not make a contribu-
tion as it would be in direct conflict with our policy." 
Although the position on legislative reapportionment 
of the Minnesota Farmers Union and the Minnesota 
State Grange was similar to that of the Farm Bureau , 
neither of these two farm organizations took the ada-
mant stand of the Farm Bureau in regard to the GB-
CLR .. Part of this may be a result of the questionable 
historical analysis of American political theory put forth 
by Charles B. Shuman, President of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, which has affected the perception of 
political reality by state and local Farm Bureau leaders 
and members. 
Shuman and the Farm Bureau leadership maintain that 
( 1) county and local government bears the same relation 
to state government as state government does to the na-
tional federal government-the so-called federal analogy; 
( 2) the majority is not always right and therefore a 
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check and balance system of one house of the legislature 
based on area and one house based on population is ab-
solutely imperative to preserve the rights of the rural 
minority; and (3) the battle is not rural versus urban 
but a battle to preserve representative government. These 
three positions, in the view of the Farm Bureau, are the 
traditional essence of the American political system; any 
deviation from them is totally new, different, and dan-
gerous. 
Although Reynolds v. Sims is frequently cited by the 
Farm Bureau leadership in its denunciations of the trend 
in legislative reapportionment, there has been an unwill-
ingness to acknowledge the brief history of American 
political theory contained in it that refutes the question-
able historical analysis of Shuman and his colleagues. 
Chief Justice Warren said, "We . . . find the federal anal-
ogy inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting 
schemes. Attempted reliance on the federal analogy ap-
pears often to be little more than an after-the-fact ration-
alization offered in defense of maladjusted state appor-
tionment arrangements. The original constitutions of 36 
of our States provided that representation in both houses 
of the state legislature would be based completely, or 
predominantly, on population . And the Founding Fa-
thers clearly had no intention of establishing a pattern 
or model for the apportionment of seats in state legisla-
tures when the system of representation in the Federal 
Congress was adopted. Demonstrative of this is the fact 
that the Northwest Ordinance adopted in the same year 
... as the Federal Constitution, provided for the appor-
tionment of seats in territorial legislatures solely on the 
basis of population .... Political subdivisions of States-
counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have 
been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have 
been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental 
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the car-
rying out of state governmental functions." 
The Farm Bureau had a different perception of the 
American political system than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The former perceived the system in terms of the actual 
apportionment of the state legislatures in the pre-1964 
period. This was, in spite of state constitutional instruc-
tions to the contrary in many states, a malapportionment 
that tended to make area a factor in representation . 
An excellent example of this perception of political 
reality by political actors was continually confronted by 
the GBCLR. In the public hearings conducted by the 
GBCLR, citizen after citizen, most of whom were from 
rural areas, testified that they wanted the Minnesota 
Constitution to continue to provide for one legislative 
house based on area and one legislative house based on 
population. Judge J. H. Sylvestre, member of the 
GBCLR, would frequently inquire of these witnesses as 
to whether they were aware that the Minnesota Consti-
tution provided for both legislative houses to be based 
on population . The answer was uniformly in the nega-
tive. 
Because the Minnesota Farm Bureau perceived the 
U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment decision as alter-
ing the political system of the state, it chose as its politi-
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cal strategy in the reapportionment conflict, ( l) non-
participation in the GBCLR and (2) concerted political 
pressure for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that 
would allow the citizens of the respective states to de-
cide by referendum whether one house of its state legis-
lature should be based on a factor other than popula-
tion. 
The Minnesota Farm Bureau's strategy was a cal-
culated risk based on the assumption that ( l ) the 
GBCLR would not prove to be a significant political 
force, and, even if it did, that the Farm Bureau through 
Myers could not produce changes that would conform 
to the Farm Bureau objectives, and that (2) it was po-
litically possible to successfully amend the U.S. Consti-
tution and the Minnesota Constitution as desired by the 
Farm Bureau. 
The Minnesota Farm Bureau underestimated the po-
litical power of the GBCLR. Although the reapportion-
ment measure that may have passed the Minnesota legis-
lature may not be an exact replica of the GBCLR pro-
posal, the GBCLR did have the following effects: ( l) 
It helped to create an increased public awareness of the 
reapportionment issue and ( 2) it provided the legisla-
ture with certain criteria and information, with the re-
sult that the legislature began work on reapportionment 
earlier than was generally expected and with greater ad-
herence to the criteria than was generally predicted . 
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Myers' failure to serve on the GBCLR meant that 
there was no opportunity for the Minnesota Farm Bu-
reau to pressure for recommendations such as weighted 
voting, which might have been politically advantageous 
to rural-agricultural interests. The Minnesota Farm Bu-
reau thus excluded itself from an important step in the 
decision-making process concerning legislative reappor-
tionment. 
It remains to be seen whether the Farm Bureau's para-
mount reliance on constitutional amendments was an 
advantageous choice in political strategy. 
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